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Abstract: The previous literature has not devoted enough space to 
“motivation for training” issues, especially for amateur sports. Generally, is 
possible imagine some factors which influence motivation for training in 
professional sports like an high remuneration, fame, etc. However is more 
difficult find these motivation factors it in the amatorial context, because an 
amatorial player already has not a substantial remuneration, has a job 
beyond sports, etc. The main result of this paper is that a large number of 
players in a team encourage each other to work hard during training session. 
All based on the assumption that more workout brings to better performance. 
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Introduction 
Even in sports the relationship between performance and incentives is very 
important and empirically some studies show that an high degree of self-
determination is associate with higher levels of performance (Gillet, 
Vallerand, Amoura, & Baldes, 2010). In a general point of view, we can argue 
that the structure of incentive is too important.  
Barnard (1938) was one of the major scholars of incentive theory and many 
general conclusions are also applicable to the sports industry. Barnard 
proposed the distinction between monetary and non-monetary benefits. From 
his words: 
 
“An organization can provide the necessary resources to its existence, then, 
either by the objective incentives it provides or by changing states of mind ... 
We will call the process of promoting the" incentive method "and the 
processes of Changing subjective attitudes "the method of persuasion" 
 
In the professional sports industry (NFL, NBA, MLS, etc.), monetary 
incentives (like sponsorship and remuneration) are very substantial and 
players are encouraged to do enough efforts during the workouts (Gibbson e 
Murphy, 1992). In addiction, team owners have to win to maximize their 
profits and to achieve this goal must encourage their players to work hard: a 
lack of incentives for team owners leads to a lack of incentives for players 
(Palomino and Rigotti, 2000). This does not mean that there are no non-
monetary incentives: fame, glory, entertainment and others are non-monetary 
incentives that for some players can also be very strong. 
However, for amateur players, not all the conclusions of the literature are 
valid: these players often have no substantial remuneration, have no 
sponsorship, and may only have non-monetary incentives. They play for the 
pleasure of doing sports and their goal is not the high remuneration but only 
to play the match. 
 
In general, as Laffont and Martimort (2001) point out, a good balance 
between incentives and performance is strongly dependent on an unstable 
and very competitive environment. If this is true, we can think that, in line with 
Laffont and Martimort, increasing the number of players in a group (as 
competition increases) increases the team's performance. This is because 
more competition drives to work harder and this leads to better performance. 
In another point of view, according to Ramis, Torregrosa, Viladrich and Cruz 
(2017), we have two level of motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The 
intrinsic motivation rappresents individuals who participate in an activity 
because their satisfaction derive from the participation itself. The extrinsic 
motivation refers to individuals who perform an activity because have 
consequent beneﬁts of participation. 
In this scheme, we can image amatorial players like individuals for whom 
internal incentives prevail over external ones. The reverse for professional 
players. 
 
So, many other studies have focused on the structure of incentives in the 
sports economy and they show  there is a strong connection between 
motivation and performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Coetzee, Grobbelaar, 
& Gird, 2006; MacNamara, Button, & Collins, 2010). However in reality there 
are few industry where empirical tests about the magnitude and effects of 
incentives are possible, due to the few available data. This is true expecially 
for the amatorial context, for which there is a structural lack of available data. 
In the end, in this paper we refer, according to the CPSA classification 
presented by Andreff and Szymanski (2006), to SPR and PRO (principally 
football and basketball) sports categories. However, we can extend these 
results to all team sports in amateur contexts. 
 
The simple model 
In general, it is possible to demonstrate what has been said in analytical 
terms as well.  
Consider a really simple model in which we analyze how the number of 
players present in a team can influence the incentive to work hard during 
workouts. As we have already mentioned, we started from the assumption 
that greater the number of workouts is, greater the team's performance is. 
In this model we will consider various variables. In particular we call: 
Q, the quality of players in the Team; 
H, the incentive to make a large number of workouts; 
L, the incentive to do a low number of workouts; 
P, team performance and 
W = number of training sessions. 
Finally, N is the number of players in the group. 
Assume that Performance depends (positvley) by number of training sessions 
(which is influenced by number of players in the Team) and by quality of 
players (Q). For this reason: 
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The most important hypothesis of this model is that players do more workouts 
greater is this difference: H + N > L - N. 
H + N is the incentive to do more efforts during training sessions, considering 
that as the competition increases in the team, having fewer opportunities to 
play, players will train harder to emerge than others: that is the reason both H 
and N are positive. If you increase the number of competitors (N), everyone 
will be encouraged to train hard to play. 
However, L-N is the incentive to not do enough workouts, which decreases 
when N increases beacause the benefit L decreases if the number of 
competitors increases: if the athlete wants to play, he will have to do efforts 
during workouts to demonstrate he is better than others. So the benefit L is 
drastically reduced by the increase in N and for this reason L is positive and 
N is negative. 
Suppose that amateur players prefer less workout (L> H) and that team 
peformance in match (P) increases as training hours increase (W). We know 
that W is greater in H than in L. Assuming that the team owners want to 
maximize Team performance, they will surely impose on players to make H. 
In a nutshell, players choose H only if N is large enough. To maximize 
performance, the company will impose H taking more players into the roster. 
Analytically, a player chooses H if and only if: 
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This means that when N is above a certain threshold (
2
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N

 ), all players 
will do H (an high number of workouts), otherwise they will be L. 
However someone might argue that this threshold does not have to be too 
large because too much competition might deter some players from going 
away and look for another team. In general, this criticism is easy to refute if 
we assume that the best players and those who engage in workouts are 
those that actually play more than others: the effect of the competition is to 
keep only the most motivated and of the highest quality players. 
 
In the end, if Performance (P) is a function of Technical Quality (Q) and the 
number of workouts (N) (we have discussed this relationship above) then we 
can conclude that the number of players sufficiently high assures a better 
performance, especially in the amateur context. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main conclusion of this paper, according to literature, is that the only 
solution to forcing players to increase their efforts, supposing remuneration 
and fame are not incentives for the amateur context, is to make the team 
more competitive by increasing the number of players. 
If you accept the basic hypothesis that a competitive environment allows the 
group to improve their performance, it can be demonstrated through with this 
model increasing the number of players in the team improves the 
performance of the group. 
Some authors may argue that this model is not perfectly adaptable to 
industrial sports professionality, because other incentives are completely 
different from amateur sportsmen. It is also possible to imagine that weighing 
more on overall performance than the efforts during the workouts is the 
quality of the team's players. 
However, it can not be concealed that even the quality of the players 
improves the number and quality of the workouts. For this reason the result of 
this model is generalizable also for the professional industry: a good team 
owner and a good coach should consider the idea of holding numerous 
number of players with the aim of improving the quality of the Workouts And 
therefore the overall performance. 
It is recalled many times, this model is perfectly applicable to the amateur 
sports industry, where monetary incentives are scarce or totally non-existent 
and is also generalizable for the professional sports industry. 
Studying the basic behavior of amateur societies and players is a path that 
literature should continue, as the general assumptions are not always 
perfectly matched. 
References 
 
1. Barnard, C., (1938), The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge. 
2. Lazera, E. and Rosen, S. (1981), ‘Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal 
Labor Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841–64. 
3. Gibbons, R., and Murphy, K. J. (1992), ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts in 
the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 100(3), 468–505 
4. Palomino, F. and Rigotti, L. (2000). The Sport League's Dilemma: 
Competitive Balance Versus Incentives To Win, Tilburg University 
CentER for Economic Research Working Paper No. 2000-109. 
5. Laffont J., and Martimort D., (2001),THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES : 
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL, Princeton. 
6. Coetzee, B., Grobbelaar, H. W., & Gird, C. C. (2006). Sport 
psychological skills that distinguish successful from less successful 
soccer teams. Journal of Human Movement Studies, 51(6), 383–401. 
7. Andreff W., Szymanski S., (2006), Handbook on the Economics of 
Sport, Edward Elgar Publishing Inc. 
8. Gillet, N., Vallerand, R., & Rosnet, E. (2009). Motivational clusters and 
performance in a real-life setting. Motivation and Emotion, 33(1), 49–62. 
9. Gillet, N., Vallerand, R. J., Amoura, S., & Baldes, B. (2010). Inﬂuence of 
coaches’ autonomy support on athletes’ motivation and sport 
performance: A test of the hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 11(2), 155–161. 
10. Szymanski S., (2010), The comparative economics of sport, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
11. MacNamara, A., Button, A., & Collins, D. (2010). The role of 
psychological characteristics in facilitating the pathway to elite 
performance: Part 1: Indentifying mental skills and behaviors. The Sport 
Psychologist, 24, 52-73. 
12. Claudia Zuber, Marc Zibung & Achim Conzelmann (2015) 
Motivational patterns as an instrument for predicting success in 
promising young football players, Journal of Sports Sciences, 33:2, 
160-168 
13. Ramis et al. (2017). The Effect of Coaches’ Controlling Style on 
the Competitive Anxiety of Young Athletes, Frontiers on Psychology, 
Volume 18, Article 572. 
 
 
 
